interesting proposal for a Hippocratic psychopharmacology can be challenged on various grounds. The Hippocratic view, "that nature is the source of healing, and that the job of the physician is to aid nature in the healing process"
1 -fails in many cases, such as autoimmune disorders. Therefore, it seems that a mixed Hippocratic and non-Hippocratic framework is required for psychiatry as medicine, as argued elsewhere. 2 Osler's rule of "treat diseases, not symptoms" 1 may be largely, if not fully, irrelevant to contemporary psychiatry, as etiology is unknown for any psychiatric disorder, and psychiatric pathophysiology is in its infancy, 3 so that active alleviation of psychiatric symptoms may currently require symptomatic treatment, that is, treatment of psychiatric symptoms and their clusters, as classified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision and the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision. A diagnostic hierarchy of psychiatric disorders with (presumably major) mood disorders trumping all other diagnoses, similar to that which Dr Ghaemi 1 argues for, was widely accepted until the last few decades, and did not prove useful. For example, psychiatric comorbidity, viewed as symptoms or disorders, was commonly ignored then, to the detriment of patients; moreover, Dr Ghaemi's 1 claim that such a diagnostic hierarchy determines the required treatment can be refuted, as illustrated by the example of major depressive disorder with psychotic features, which commonly does not respond to, or worsens with, antidepressant medications and requires antipsychotic medications or electroconvulsive therapy (which is not a specific antidepressant treatment).
Hippocratic philosophy of disease and treatment implies the importance of self-organization in health, illness, and care, and as such, is associated with some of the foundations of modern medical science, for example, as illustrated by the notion of homeostasis. 4 Yet this philosophy does not entail Hippocratic ethics. Physicians nowadays should not and mostly do not accept the ethics of the Hippocratic oath, at least the aspect that ignores patient self-determination or autonomy, 5 which is a fundamental principle in contemporary bioethics, 6 including in psychiatric ethics. 7 Patient choice is a mainstay of contemporary psychiatry, as illustrated in the growing literature on recovery of people with severe psychiatric disorders. 8 Admittedly, people with psychiatric disorders are sometimes impaired in their self-determination or autonomy. Established institutions such as substitute decision making, as well as novel participatory frameworks such as dialogical bioethics, 9 support such patients in the determination of their care.
